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Abstract 
Older workers typically possess older vintages of skills than younger workers, and they may 
suffer more from technological change. Experienced workers never the less have accumulated 
human capital that make them suitable for adopting new technologies. On the other hand, to 
adjust to new technology, workers must invest in training and this may not be worthwhile for 
the oldest workers. We exploit the approach by Bartel and Sicherman (1993) to identify this 
effect by estimating the retirement response to technological change dependent on how often it 
occurs. If technological change occurs often, workers continuously invest in on-the-job training 
which may isolate them from the negative effect of technological change. We examine two 
hypotheses about the effects of technological changes on early retirement measured for workers 
from the age of 50 to mandatory age of retirement at 67. First, we examine whether workers in 
firms with higher rates of anticipated technological change retire later than workers in firms 
with lower rates of technological change. Second, we examine if (unanticipated) technological 
change are positively correlated with earlier retirement. We use a matched employer-employee 
data set with a rich set of controls for worker, firm and local labour market characteristics, and 
firm level measures of anticipated and not-anticipated technological change. We find a negative 
correlation between early retirement and anticipated technological change only for the oldest 
male workers (62 to 66). Further, we find a higher probability of transition to retirement for 
workers above 60 for firms introducing new process technologies. 
 
                                                     
* The research project has received financial support from the Research Council of Norway. 
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 The introduction of new technologies over the last decades, have certainly increased the 
productivity and welfare of the working population in the Western countries. The introduction 
of new technologies is also found to affect the structure of employment, and in particular 
technological change has been found to be biased against low-skilled workers (Machin and Van 
Reenen, 1998; Krueger, 1993; Acemoglu, 1998; Author, Katz, and Krueger, 1998; Salvanes 
and Førre, 2003). Thus, the burden of the costs of this productivity gain is found to be 
unequally distributed across groups of workers. The question we ask in this paper is whether 
new technology is biased against the work prospective of older workers. This issue is all the 
more timely since in Europe the employment rate of older workers has been declining over 
time and for workers older than 55 it is below 50 percent, while its more than 50 in the US. 
Most of this change is probably attributed to supply factors such as generous benefits (Gruber 
and Wise, 2004).1 The present paper focus on whether changes on the demand side play a role 
in explaining the change in employment prospect of older workers by analyzing the effect on 
retirement of technological change.  
The prediction from theory is not clear when it comes to the effect on demand for older 
workers. Older workers typically possess older vintages of skills than younger workers. This is 
because their investment in formal education typically is of an older date, and that they have 
accumulated human capital on the job over a longer period. Accordingly, their skill mix is of an 
older date; less suited to match new technologies. Hence it is likely that older workers suffer 
more from technological change with respect to depreciation of human capital. Weinberg 
(2005) argues on the other hand that experienced workers never the less have accumulated 
human capital that make them suitable for adopting new technologies. On the other hand, to 
adjust to new technology workers must invest in training to acquire technology-relevant skills. 
The investment decision will among other factors depend on the time left till planned or 
mandatory retirement. For older workers the investment in training may not be worthwhile if 
the time left to retirement gives a too short time horizon to make the investment profitable. The 
consequence may be to withdraw from work earlier than planned. Although workers of all ages 
have similar ability to adopt new technologies, the period to recover costs of investments in 
human capital may be to short for older workers.2  
                                                     
1 It is of course not clear whether the supply or demand forces are really important since most probably much of the changes in 
benefit schemes for early retirement has been to accommodate changes taking place in firms demand for workers.                 
2 There is some support for the fact that the ability to adopt computer use is not so dependent on age (or perhaps 
 the net effect of the vintage human capital effect and experience effect), in that the relationship between 
 computer use and age seems to be quite flat with a slightly more frequent use by the age groups 30-49 
 (Weinberg, 2005; Friedberg, 2003, Borghans and ter Weel, 2002). Weinberg (2005) also finds the age-computer 
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One expectation from this reasoning is that one would expect the probability of leaving 
the labour market is increasing with age when new technology is introduced to the firm ceteris 
paribus. However, the timing of the retirement decision will also depend on the age of the 
accumulated human capital through on-the-job training. We exploit the approach Bartel and 
Sicherman (1993) suggested to identify this effect by estimating the retirement response to 
technological change dependent on how often it occurs. The idea is as follows. Some firms are 
characterized by high rates of continuous technological changes. In such firms, workers have to 
update their human capital continuously. As a consequence, older workers who have chosen to 
stay in such firms probably have a less obsolete human capital than workers of the same age in 
other firms, and are more able to take advantage of the higher productivity, and accordingly 
wages, that follow from technological changes without a large new investment in human 
capital. We may therefore expect workers in such plants to retire later. This is a combined 
effect of technical change and selection of workers into such plants. In plants where 
technological changes are more extraordinary, the required investment in new skills following a 
technological change may be larger and more costly. All else equal, this will make retirement 
more attractive.  
In our approach we analyze early retirement consequence for older workers by 
distinguishing between firm level differences in expected and unexpected technological change 
by age groups of workers. We use a very rich data set consisting of a rich matched worker-firm 
dataset with firm-level indicators of technological change in addition to other firm controls that 
are relevant for workers retirement decision both at the worker (wealth, indicator for health 
etc), firm (downsizing or not), and local labour market level (unemployment rate, spillover 
effect from a high degree of early retirement in the local labour market). Other papers within 
this literature mainly rely on indirect indicators of technological change such as total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth measured at a rather aggregate (two-digit) industry level. Firms, 
even within narrowly defined industries, may differ with respect to rates of technological 
changes, and using measures of technological changes at the firm level accounts for this 
possible heterogeneity (Haltiwanger, Lane and Spitzer, 1999; Doms, Dunne and Troske, 1997). 
We use investments in machinery and equipment over a period of time as an indicator of 
normal or expected technological change, while introduction of new process technology 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 use profile differs by education; experience to a certain extent substitutes for formal education.  
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(conditional on investment level) is an indicator of extraordinary or unexpected technological 
change.  
Our empirical analysis gives support to a hypothesis that technological changes in the 
firm where the worker is employed do affect retirement decisions of older workers. Older male 
workers in their 60s with only very few years left before mandatory retirement age in firms 
with higher “normal” rates of technological changes retire later than workers in firms with 
lower rates of technological changes. For women we do not find any effect. In addition, we find 
that some of the oldest workers with only very few years left before mandatory retirement age 
in firms changing process technology retire earlier than workers in firms with no change in 
process technology. Hence, older workers in firms who experience an “extraordinary” 
technological change retire earlier. Hence our results are in line with those obtained using more 
crude measures of technological change and with less worker, firm, and labour market controls, 
such as Bartel and Sicherman (1993). 
The next section will give a short presentation of some earlier studies on technological 
changes and early retirement. In section 3 we give a brief definition of technological changes, 
as well as a description of some important facts about the early retirement options in Norway 
and the empirical specification. Section 4 is a short presentation of the data, and section 5 
describes some of the data in more depth. Section 6 presents the results, and section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature on technological changes and retirement 
 
 The literature on technological changes and older workers retirement from the labour 
market is relatively small. There is a parallel literature on the impact of technological change 
on wages of older workers and especially the experience premium, which is strongly related 
(see for instance Weinberg, 2005; Borghans and ter Weel, 2002, 2006). The earliest study is 
Bartel and Sicherman (1993). Based on the theoretical human capital model in Ben-Porath 
(1967), they formulate two hypotheses on the relationship between general technological 
changes and early retirement. Their line of argument goes as follows: Training is required to 
reap the benefits of technological change. Some of the existing human capital is made obsolete 
by technological change. The effects on retirement behaviour depend on the individual costs 
and benefits associated with the technological change given an optimal response with respect to 
investment in training. 
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  Their first hypothesis concerns expected or continuous technological change. Their 
prediction is that workers in firms or industries with high rates of technological change retire 
later than workers in firms or industries characterized by low rates of technological change, 
provided that firms with high rates of technological change offer more on-the-job training to 
take advantage of the new technology. More on-the-job training, given the level of 
technological change, implies a steeper wage profile and makes it more attractive to remain in 
work and retire later. However, technological change depreciates existing human capital. All 
else being equal, this reduces the return on investment in training. The net effect is ambiguous. 
Firms with higher rates of technological change attract workers who are able to benefit more 
from technological change. Among older workers, these will be people who have high returns 
on investment in training and/or people who plan to remain in work for longer. 
 Their second hypothesis relates to sudden or unexpected technological change. Workers 
respond to the continuous or normal rate of technological change by adjusting their levels of 
continuous investment in training. A sudden technological change leads to an acute 
depreciation of human capital, with which is associated a wage loss that can only be avoided 
through investment in human capital (or through a change in planned investment). For older 
workers, the returns to such investments are lower, because their remaining working lives are 
shorter. Sudden technological change therefore increases the retirement probability of older 
workers. 
 Bartel and Sicherman (1993) test their hypotheses by using data from the National 
Longitudinal Surveys of Older Men for the period 1966–1983. Their measure of technological 
change is based on the growth in TFP at the two-digit industry level. Continuous technological 
change is measured by using a 10-year mean of TFP growth. Unexpected technological change, 
or 'shocks', is measured by using a standardized annual deviation from the normal rate. They 
estimate a binary logit model of retirement, and control for a large number of retirement-
relevant individual characteristics as well as technological change. The results support both 
hypotheses. Older workers in industries with high rates of technological change retire later than 
older workers in industries with low rates of technological change. In addition, unexpected 
increases in technological change are positively correlated with early retirement. 
 Ahituv and Zeira (2001) develop a theoretical overlapping generations model that 
incorporates technological change to illustrate the links between technological change and early 
retirement. The predictions of the model are consistent with the hypotheses stated above. That 
is, the closer a worker is to the planned retirement age, the less worthwhile is training because 
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of the short time left in work to reap the benefits of the investment in training required to learn 
the new technology. This may in turn lead to an earlier withdrawal from the labor market. The 
authors also note that the productivity-enhancing effect of technological change on wages may 
generate incentives to stay in work longer. By using five-year TFP industry averages to 
measure technological change, and by using data from the Health and Retirement Study, they 
find that technological change has a negative effect on the labor supply of older workers. 
However, for those remaining in work, technological change has a positive effect on wages. 
 A similar analysis was undertaken by Friedberg (2003), who investigates the 
relationship between computer use and retirement. Using data from the Current Population 
Survey, she shows that those who use computers retire later than those who do not use 
computers. This may be because workers using computers have planned to retire later than 
nonusers, or because those planning to retire later choose to invest in computer knowledge. 
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, she also finds indications that impending 
retirement does not generate incentives to learn to use computers because there is insufficient 
time before retirement to reap the benefits. This analysis differs from those of Bartel and 
Sicherman (1993) and Ahituv and Zeira (2001) by analyzing the use of one type of equipment, 
namely computers, rather than investigating technological change in general. 
 From the review of these studies, we can draw some conclusions. There seems to be a 
relationship between technological change and early retirement. Workers in industries with 
high rates of technological change seem to retire later than do workers in industries with low 
rates of technological change. This may be because workers in industries with high rates of 
technological change have planned to work longer than workers in industries with low rates of 
technological change, and hence train more than workers planning to retire earlier. The studies 
also indicate that unexpected technological change is negatively correlated with labor force 
participation. Furthermore, Ahituv and Zeira (2001) find evidence of a negative aggregate 
effect of technological change on early retirement. 
 
 
3. How should we measure technological change? 
 
  In the literature, several measures of technological change have been used. One 
commonly used measure is TFP. Ideally, TFP measures disembodied technological change, that 
is, increases in output that are unrelated to the use of more inputs or changes in the quality of 
inputs. TFP is measured as the residual of the difference between changes in output and the 
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changes in an index of inputs between two periods. TFP may reflect the effects of all factors 
not captured by measured inputs but empirical studies show that TFP is related to more direct 
measures of technological change, such as R&D intensity; see Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991), 
Geroski (1994), and Sterlachinni (1989). 
 Both Bartel and Sicherman (1993) and Ahituv and Zeira (2001) measure technological 
change by using TFP growth at a highly aggregated industry level. Hence, they treat firms 
within these industries as having the same rates of technological change. A consistent finding 
in many studies at the firm level is that there is much heterogeneity between firms, even within 
narrowly defined industries, in many respects. A priori, there is no reason to believe that this is 
not the case with respect to technological change. For Norwegian manufacturing, to which our 
data relate, Møen (1998) shows that there is a high degree of heterogeneity in firm-level TFP 
growth, even within narrowly defined industries. This indicates that industry-level TFP growth 
may not reflect the technological change experienced by individual workers and firms in the 
industry, which is the appropriate measure to use when studying how technological change 
affects retirement behavior. As is well known, TFP growth is measured as a residual and may 
be influenced by factors other than technological change. Hence, one should use indicators that 
measure changes in the technology facing workers that are available at the firm level. 
 One obvious candidate is R&D intensity in the firm. Technological change in a firm is 
often, but not necessarily, fundamentally linked to research activity. First, not all technological 
change is related to the firm's own R&D activity. The technology faced by workers may change 
substantially even if there is no R&D in the firm because, for example, of the use of new 
equipment developed by others. Second, not all R&D activity in a firm implies changes in the 
technology facing workers. Much R&D is directed towards developing new products, which 
may or may not influence the production process. 
 Our measures of technological change (details on the construction of which are given in 
Section 6) attempt to capture changes affecting the working environment in the firm. 
Technological change typically requires the acquisition of new machinery and equipment. To 
the extent that the technology facing workers is embodied in the equipment that workers use, 
investment in these capital goods may be an indicator of the rate of technological change. To 
measure the level of 'continuous' or expected technological change, we need an indicator of the 
normal level of acquisitions in the firm. The average investment rate or the median investment 
rate at the firm level over the period we are analyzing may be used to proxy the normal level of 
acquisitions of machinery and equipment, which captures the expected rate of technological 
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change in the firm. We use the median investment rate to measure the normal level of 
technological change. 
 An additional measure of technological change is an indicator of whether the firm has 
implemented new process technologies. Information on this can be found in R&D surveys. 
Whereas investments in machinery and equipment may reflect the normal rate of technological 
change, changes in process technology may reflect extraordinary changes in technology, 
particularly when we condition on the investment rates in capital equipment, in the econometric 
analysis. Although changes in process technology may not be completely unexpected by 
workers in a firm, we assume that this variable is an appropriate measure of the implementation 
of new technology in the firm. Generally, the distinction between the operationalization of 
unexpected (extraordinary) and expected (normal) technological change is ambiguous. 
Although it is arguably the case that changes in process technology mainly reflect unexpected 
changes and that the normal investment rate broadly reflects expected changes, one should be 
cautious in interpreting the results as the estimated effects of different kinds of changes. 
 
 
4. Early retirement in Norway  
 
  The official retirement age in Norway is 67 years. At the age of 67, everyone has the 
right to withdraw from the labor market and receive an old age pension. Between 67 and 70, 
the old age pension is reduced according to labor income earned. From the age of 70, the old 
age pension income is no longer reduced because of labor income. For workers in some 
professions, such as the police and armed services, the retirement age is below 67 years. 
 Many retire before the official retirement age, and there are several possible ways of 
leaving employment to retire. The largest early retirement scheme involves the disability 
pension. People who lose their ability to earn income may, after medical examination, receive a 
disability pension. More than 300,000 persons were on a disability pension in 2005, and the 
number has increased quite strongly over the past decade. The total number of employed 
persons was 2.3 million in 2005, so the disability pension represents a common exit route from 
the labor force. 
 A special early retirement scheme, the AFP, was implemented in 1989. This was the 
result of negotiations between the trade unions and employers' organizations. The scheme 
allows employees in establishments covered by the scheme to retire before the official 
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retirement age. In addition, there are individual requirements regarding previous employment 
and income. That is, one must: i) have an annual income of at least NOK 60,000 (USD 10,000) 
in 2005 prices in the year of retirement and in the preceding year; ii) have earned pension 
points (that is, have been working) in the national social insurance scheme for at least 10 years 
after the age of 50; and iii) have had an average income of at least NOK 120,000 (USD 20,000) 
in 2005 prices in one's 10 highest-earning years since 1967. The retirement age under the AFP 
was originally 66 years. It has been reduced several times, and since 1998, has been at 62 years. 
Ordinary old-age pension income from the age of 67 is not affected by being in the AFP. 
Because delaying or not having AFP income does not increase pensions received later, the 
scheme gives incentives to retire at the first opportunity. At the end of 2005, there were 37,395 
persons on an AFP pension. 
 The disability pension and the AFP represent the two main early retirement schemes. In 
addition, unemployment and rehabilitation may represent early retirement for older people. 
Although those in both groups intend to return to work, in practice few do so. In addition to 
these schemes, there are various private arrangements that allow employees to withdraw from 
work before the age of 67. Given that there are many ways to move from work into 'official' 
early retirement and retirement schemes, a more comprehensive definition of early retirement is 
required for our empirical analysis. This is because our main purpose is to study how 
technological change affects older workers who exit from the labor market, rather than to 
analyze the effects of the exit routes from work into retirement. 
 
 
4.1 Patterns of retirement 
 
  We consider the retirement patterns of older workers. In this context, 'older' is defined 
as between 50 and 66 years of age. Figures 1 and 2 below cover the period 1994–2001. The 
sample consists of all persons in Norway who were aged 50–66 in this period and who were in 
work when first included in the sample. Constructing the sample in this way implies that the 
observations cannot be interpreted as being equivalent to hazard-rate figures. This is because, 
for those who are younger, sampled individuals are those who are in work when younger, 
whereas for those who are older, we condition on them being in work at an older age. For 
example, for a person aged 51, the rates are conditional on being in work at the age of 50, while 
for someone aged 65, the rate is a weighted mean of the rates for those who were between 58 
and 64 and in work in 1994. However, cohort-specific hazards exhibit a similar pattern, and we 
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prefer this more compact exposition. The figures reveal that disability pensions and AFP 
pensions dominate. The AFP pension is available for some workers from the age of 62 until the 
age of 66, and there is a large increase in the share of individuals on AFP pensions from the age 
of 62 to the age of 66. The share of those having exited from work to draw a disability pension 
increases almost linearly with age. Among 66-year-old males, 16 percent of the sample is on a 
disability pension. For females, the share is 18 percent. For the AFP pension, the corresponding 
shares are about 33 percent for men and nearly 27 percent for women. As shown in Appendix 
D, the share of the eligible age group in the AFP has increased over time, to some degree at the 
expense of the share on disability benefits. The share of 'younger olds' on a disability pension 
has increased over time. 
 The group 'other' consists of persons not belonging to any of the other five groups. 
These may be individuals who remain at home, individuals with private pensions, and persons 
in occupations with a lower retirement age than the official one. For men, just over 12 percent 
of those aged 66 are in this group, while more than 14 percent of women of the same age are in 
this group. Less than one percent were unemployed throughout the period. Few people of any 
age are on temporary disability pensions or undergoing rehabilitation. 
 Our study covers manufacturing. The corresponding figures for individuals in the 
manufacturing industry are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Similarly to the whole economy, 
disability pensions and AFP pensions dominate. For 66-year-old men, the share of those on an 
AFP pension is nearly 46 percent, which is higher than for the economy as a whole. Fifteen 
percent have a disability pension, and this is similar to the share for the whole economy. For 
women, the share of 66-year-olds with an AFP pension is 34 percent; 16 percent get a disability 
pension. For both men and women, unemployment increases from the age of 60. The group 
'other' has a lower share out-of-work women and men than for the whole economy. This may 
be because occupations with lower retirement ages are outside manufacturing. It may also be 
that, in manufacturing, a higher share of workers than in the rest of the economy have the 
option to retire with an AFP pension.  
 Details of the construction of our sample are given in Section 6. In Figures 5 and 6, we 
show the shares of those who are out of work for our sample, which covers total manufacturing. 
Comparing the manufacturing industry with our sample shows that the shares with disability 
and AFP pensions are higher in our sample. Otherwise, the patterns are similar to 
manufacturing as a whole. However, there are fewer in the group 'other' in the sample. Because 
our sample includes only joint-stock companies, most small firms are excluded from the 
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sample. Larger firms are more likely to be affiliated to the AFP scheme. This may explain why 
the share in the group 'other' is lower in our sample than for the whole manufacturing sector. 
 
 
4.2 Defining retirement 
 
  The preceding discussion indicates that there are several possible ways into early 
retirement. The AFP and disability pension are in practice 'absorbing states', in the sense that 
few return to work from these states. In Appendix A, we show simple survival rates for 
individuals in unemployment, rehabilitation, and the group we have labeled 'other'. This last 
group comprises individuals who are out of work but are not in any of the other out-of-work 
states. When an individual over the age of 50 is in one of these states, the probability of leaving 
that state to work is quite low, although this varies depending on the state. Most individuals on 
rehabilitation either continue on rehabilitation or end up receiving a disability pension. For 
unemployed individuals, going back to work is more likely but this probability decreases with 
age. The same is the case for the group 'other'. Specifically, many women stay in the group 
'other', many of whom are probably staying at home. Details of the construction of the 
retirement measure are given in Section 6. 
 
 
5 Econometric specification 
 
 Our econometric analysis focuses on individuals observed in work. We then estimate 
the probability of retiring conditional on having work in one or more of the three last years. 
Assume that we have the following model 
 
ijtijt uy +++×+×+= ∑∑∑ γzψxPInvAgeφMInvestAgeβAgeα jtitjt6050 itj6050 it6050 it*   
i=1,………., N, j=1,……..,J and t=1,…….T 
 
where i is the individual index, j is the firm index t is the year index. Further, *ijty is a latent 
variable representing individual propensity to work. itx are individual specific variables such as 
education, part-time work, net wealth, married, health, whether the person is covered by a 
particular type of early retirement scheme (AFP); and local labour market characteristics; 
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proportion on early retirement in county, local unemployment rate, jtz  are the firm level 
variables we control for; downsizing, characteristics. Year dummies, two-digit sector dummies 
as well as industry trends (interactions year and industry dummies are included. The term ijtu is 
a stochastic error term.  
 The variables of interest are two types of technical change interacted with the age of the 
worker (Age). Age is measured in a flexible way by including a dummy for each age; 0 for 
those 50 years of age and a new dummy up to the age of 66. Technical change is measured by 
two different measures– permanent as measured by median machinery investment over years at 
the firm level (MInvest) – and the unexpected technical change as measured by adoption of 
new processes (PInvest).  
We do not observe the latent variable directly, but only whether the individual is 
working or retired. The dependent variable is ijty 0=  if the individual i in firm j is in work at 
time t, and ijty 1= if individual i, from firm j, is retired at time t. Transition from work to 
retirement occurs when *ijty 0> . If we let C comprise all the right-hand side variables in the 
equation above, and assume that the error terms are standard normal, ( )ijtu | C 0,1  we have the 
probit model  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ijt it ijt ijt itP y 1| C P C u 0 P u C C= = + > = > − =it λ λ Φ λ  
 
where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative density function. So, ( )itC itxΦ λ is the 
probability of retiring in period t conditional on being in work in period t-1 and/or t-2 and/or t-
3.   
 
6. Sample and variable construction 
 
  The data used in this study are mainly from Norwegian administrative registers for 
firms and individuals. The use of consistent firm and personal identifiers across registers 
facilitates the linking of different data sets. Some registers contain both firm and personal 
identifiers, which enables the creation of linked employer–employee data sets. 
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6.1 Sample of firms and firm-level variables 
 
  The manufacturing statistics are from an annual census covering all establishments in the 
manufacturing sector. The accounts statistics cover all nonfinancial joint-stock companies. The 
establishments covered in the manufacturing statistics are aggregated to the firm level and merged with 
the accounts statistics; see Raknerud et al. (2003). This capital database covers all manufacturing joint-
stock companies. Data on investment in new capital goods are taken from the manufacturing statistics. 
The values of investments are in current prices. The stock of capital is taken from the accounts statistics. 
Originally, the stock values were given in historic-cost prices. We have converted these values into 
current prices by using price indices for investment in new capital goods. The R&D survey is biennial. 
We use the surveys from 1997, 1999, and 2001. We use a variable stating whether the firm introduced 
new or significantly improved production processes during the previous three years, including the year 
of the survey. This is a binary variable, taking the value of unity if the firm has introduced new or 
improved production processes, and zero otherwise. When taken together, these data sets provide us 
with a sample of 4,717 firm-year observations, on 1,626 firms in 1997, 1,648 firms in 1999 and 1,443 
firms in 2001. 
 To measure the level of 'continuous' or expected technological change, we need a measure of 
the normal level of acquisitions in the firm. The average investment rate or the median investment rate 
at the firm level over the period under study can be used to proxy for the normal level of acquisitions of 
machinery and equipment, which represents the expected rate of technological change in the firm. We 
use the median investment rate to measure the normal level of technological change. We use 
information on investment in machinery and equipment, which comprises machines, tools, equipment, 
furniture, and cars and other transport vehicles. Throughout, we use the term 'machine capital' for all 
these capital goods. Investment rates are calculated by dividing the amount of investment in machine 
capital during the year by the net stock of machine capital at the beginning of the year. The investment 
rate is zero if there are no investments during a year; the rate is positive when investment exceeds zero. 
The median investment rate at the firm level is interacted with age to construct age-specific technology 
variables. We interact the median investment rate with age because the correlation between the rate of 
technological change and the probability of retirement is expected to vary with age, and this effect is 
expected to be larger at higher ages. Hence, we use a variable for the rate of technological change for 
each age. The variable takes the value of the product of the age and the median investment rate, and 
zero otherwise. 
 Data for process changes are taken from the R&D statistics in Statistics Norway (Statistics 
Norway, 2004). The R&D statistics come from two surveys: the innovation survey, which is available 
for 1997 and 2001; and the R&D survey, which is used for 1999. In all surveys, the following question 
(from the 2001 survey) was asked: "During the period 1999–2001, has your enterprise introduced any 
new or significantly improved production processes including methods of supplying services and ways 
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of delivering products?"3 From this, we construct a binary variable that indicates whether the firm has 
taken into use new processes during the previous three years, including the year of the survey. We 
interact the variable with age to construct age-specific variables for new process technology in the same 
way as for the rates of technological change variables described above. 
 When firms downsize, which lowers the number of employees, workers of different ages may 
be affected differently, and some older workers may retire. Firms may also offer retirement packages 
when implementing downsizing. Therefore, we include a dummy variable that is unity for firms that 
downsize, and zero otherwise. 
 In Table 1, we report descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample. In each year, a minority 
of firms implemented new technology. The average median investment rates are similar between years 
and between firms that implemented new process technology and those that did not. 
 
 
6.2 Individual and local labour market data 
 
  We use individual-level data for the period 1994–2001. These data are taken from the 
FD–TRYGD database in Statistics Norway.4 This database has detailed information on 
employment relations and different pensions as well as information on education and incomes 
at the individual level. The FD–TRYGD database is constructed from administrative registers 
covering the entire Norwegian population but we limit our sample to workers between 50 and 
66 years of age. We create biennial data files in which individual status is recorded at the end 
of the year. In this way, we create three cross-sectional data sets. Some firms and individuals 
are included in more than one of the cross-sectional samples. The total number of observations 
is 140,920. The observations are distributed fairly evenly across the three years for which we 
have observations. In Appendix C, we describe the construction of the sample and present an 
overview of the observations by year. 
 In our econometric specification, we include age as a conditioning variable. This is 
because the data on retirement show that the proportion of retired persons increases with age. 
We construct a dummy variable for each age. Arguably, there is a positive correlation between 
bad health and early retirement, and in particular transitions to rehabilitation and disability 
pension. Sick leave is an indicator of bad health. We use data on sick leave beyond two weeks 
as an indicator of individual health. Controlling for educational levels is important. The 
propensity to retire early may differ greatly between individuals with different educational 
                                                     
3 From the R&D survey of 2001, question C.2.1 in the questionnaire. 
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levels. Individuals with more education have invested more in their human capital and may 
have a greater incentive to work longer to reap the benefits of this investment. In addition, 
individuals with more education may have more interesting jobs. Thus, we expect individuals 
with more education to retire later. 
 There may be differences between workers who can retire with an AFP pension and 
workers who do not have this early retirement option. Workers in firms belonging to the AFP 
who fulfill the individual requirements for previous work experience and income described in 
Section 4.1 can retire with an AFP pension. We include a dummy variable for each age 
between 62 to 66 years to represent entitlement to the AFP pension. This dummy variable is 
unity for those who can retire with an AFP and zero otherwise. The local unemployment rate is 
a measure of the difficultly of finding work. Thus, we include the local unemployment rate as a 
control variable. Arguably, local unemployment is positively correlated with early retirement. 
We also include a dummy variable for part-time work. Those working part-time are arguably 
less attached to the labor market and thus may be more likely to withdraw early from the labor 
market. 
 Many factors influence individuals' retirement behavior. Apart from those already 
mentioned, norms may be formed regarding early retirement. That is, previous retirement 
behavior may influence current retirement behavior. If early retirement is common, this may 
make early retirement the norm. Hence, we include the share of retired people in the county as 
a variable representing the norm. See Rege et al. (2007) for an analysis of this phenomenon. 
 We also include variables for married people and measures of net wealth. The 
relationship between marriage status and early retirement depends on various factors, such as 
the retirement options available and spouses' labor market status. Thus, the effect of marriage 
on retirement is ambiguous. The same is the case for net wealth. On the one hand, individuals 
with high net wealth can become self-funded retirees. On the other hand, those with high net 
wealth may have more interesting jobs and, hence, want to retire later. Descriptive statistics for 
the independent variables are reported in Table 2. 
 
    
7. Results 
 
  In this section, we report our estimates of the model described in Section 5. The results 
                                                                                                                                                                        
4 Documentation (in Norwegian) of the database can be found at this address: http://www.ssb.no/emner/03/fd-trygd/ 
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 from separate pooled probit regressions for women and men for the choice between work and 
retirement are shown in Table 3. In addition to the included variables, we also included dummy 
variables at the five-digit NACE level interacted with year dummy variables, creating year-
specific industry dummy variables. This was done to capture industry-specific differences – 
and possibly trends – in retirement rates. 
 The empirical results give some support to our hypothesized relationships between 
technological change and early retirement. From the preceding theoretical discussion, one 
would expect negative coefficients on the interaction terms between age and median investment 
rates, which measure the continuous or anticipated rate of technological change. Higher median 
investment rates should, all else being equal, be associated with later retirement. Further, the 
negative correlation is expected to be larger for the highest ages. For men, the sign is negative 
and significant for all ages from and above 62. The regression for women has negative signs for 
ages of 63 and above, but the coefficient estimates are not significant. We expect positive 
coefficients for the interaction terms between the dummy variable for changes in process 
technology and age, which would indicate a positive correlation between the implementation of 
new process technology and the probability of early retirement for older workers. For men, the 
coefficients are positive for ages above 60 but only significant for ages 64 and 66. The 
coefficients are positive for women from and above 62 but only the coefficient for the 65-
years-old variable is significant. 
 Let us consider further the sizes of the estimated effects from the probit model in Table 
3. We calculate the change in probability of retirement (evaluated at sample means) for the two 
technological-change variables for ages 60 and above. We calculate the difference, ceteris 
paribus, in retirement rates between individuals in firms with process changes and individuals 
in firms that do not implement process changes. Further, we estimate the difference in 
retirement rates following an increase in the median investment rate of 10 percentage points 
above the average median investment rate in the sample. The results are reported in Table 4. 
The effect of process changes is positive and significant for men aged 64 and 66; the estimated 
probability of workers retiring is about five percentage points higher in firms experiencing 
process changes. For 60-year-old men, the estimated effect is negative and significant. For the 
other ages, the effect is positive as expected but the coefficients are not significant. For women, 
the results are more mixed. Only the coefficient for women aged 65 years is positive and 
significant. The estimated effect is about four percentage points. The estimated effect of an 
increase in the median investment rate of 10 percentage points is a reduction of between one 
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and two percentage points in the probability of retirement for men between 62 and 66. For 
women, although the sign is negative for the three oldest cohorts, none of the coefficients is 
significant. 
 For the other control variables, as expected, the coefficients for the age dummies are 
positive and significant for both genders. To account for the AFP early retirement scheme, we 
have included dummy variables for those who can withdraw from work by collecting an AFP 
pension. These dummy variables have positive and significant effects. The variable for health, 
which is based on data for sick leave of two weeks or more, has a positive coefficient, as 
expected, although it is only statistically significant for men. Further, all else being equal, 
people with more education (than compulsory schooling) are less likely to retire early, as 
expected. 
 The local unemployment rate is assumed to be one of the measures used by physicians 
when evaluating whether an individual is entitled to a disability pension. The local 
unemployment rate indicates labor market conditions and thus reflects the possibilities of 
finding a new job for those who are unemployed or otherwise out of the labor market. The 
coefficient on this variable is positive and significant, as expected. The higher the 
unemployment rate, the more difficult it is to find a job, and the higher is the probability of 
early retirement. Reductions in employment at the plant level may be followed by the early 
retirement of some older workers. We obtain a positive coefficient for this variable. Another 
variable that reflects the behavior of people in the same geographical area, and which may 
affect the probability of early retirement, is the share of retired people in the county. This 
variable has a positive and significant coefficient. The coefficient on part-time work indicates 
that part-time workers are more likely to retire early. The dummy variable for marriage is 
negative and significant for both women and men. The coefficient on net wealth is not 
significant in either of the two regressions. We now look at the results from regressions 
relating to the transition to disability and AFP pensions separately. From our sample, in the 
regressions relating to the transition to disability, we discard observations that involve 
transition from work to states other than a disability pension. For transition to the AFP, we only 
use observations for individuals who can withdraw from work with an AFP pension, and only 
the transition to an AFP pension is considered. The results from these regressions are shown in 
Appendix A. Here, we report only the estimated effects of the technological-change variables 
for the highest ages. In Table 5, the results for transition to a disability pension are reported. 
Table 6 reports the results for transition to an AFP pension. 
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 Table 5 shows that all the effects of process changes are positive for men. However, the 
effect is only significant for those who are 64 years old. Men aged 64 in firms with process 
changes are 7.2 percentage points more likely to retire with a disability pension. For women, 
none of the effects is significant. The effect of expected technological change is negative for 
the oldest cohorts for both men and women. The effects are only significant for three male age 
cohorts, those who are 63 to 65 years old, and vary between 1.3 and 3.4 percentage points. 
The results in Table 6 show that process changes have a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of retiring with an AFP pension only for 66-year-old men and 65-year-old women. 
The effect of expected technological change is negative and significant for men aged 64 and 66. 
The estimated effects are around one percentage point. For women, the effect is only significant 
for those aged 62 years old, for whom it is positive. 
 We conducted a number of robustness checks. That is, we estimated the model 
separately for workers with different levels and types of schooling. We found that the results 
were similar across worker categories. 
 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
 Technological changes affect the labor market in several ways. It changes the skill 
requirements of jobs and makes some of the existing human capital obsolete. In this paper we 
have analyzed the relationship between technological changes and early retirement behaviour 
of older workers. Older workers typically possess older vintages of skills than younger 
workers, and they may suffer more from technological changes. Experienced workers never the 
less have accumulated human capital making them suitable for adopting new technologies. On 
the other hand, to adjust to new technology, workers must invest in training and this may not be 
worthwhile for the oldest workers. We exploit the approach by Bartel and Sicherman (1993) to 
identify this effect by estimating the retirement response to technological change dependent on 
how often it occurs. If technological change occurs often, workers continuously invest in on-
the-job training, which may isolate them from the negative effect of technological change. We 
examine two hypotheses about the effects of technological changes on early retirement 
measured for workers from the age of 50 to mandatory age of retirement at 67. First, we 
examine whether workers in firms with higher rates of anticipated technological change retire 
later than workers in firms with lower rates of technological change. Second, we examine if 
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(unanticipated) technological change are positively correlated with earlier retirement. We use a 
matched employer-employee data set with a rich set of controls for worker, firm and local 
labour market characteristics, and firm level measures of anticipated and not-anticipated 
technological change. Changes in production processes are assumed to capture unanticipated 
technological changes. In line with Bartel and Sicherman (1993) using industry level measures 
of technology and far less worker and firm controls, we find a negative correlation between 
early retirement only for the oldest male workers (62 to 66) for those firms with high rates of 
anticipated technological change. Further, we find a higher probability of transition to 
retirement for workers above 60 for firms introducing new process technologies. 
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Figure 1:
Share out of work for men aged 50 years and older by age, 1994-2001
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Figure 2:
Share out of work for women 50 years and older by age, 1994-2001
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Figure 3:
Share out of work for men 50 years and older in the manufacturing 
industry by age, 1994-2001
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Figure 4:
Share out of work for women 50 years and older in the manufacturing 
industry by age, 1994-2001
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66
Disability pension
Temporary disability pension
Rehabilitation
AFP pension
Unemployed
Other
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
24 
Figure 5:
Share out of work for men 50 years and older in our sample from the 
manufacturing industry by age, 1994-2001
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Figure 6:
Share out of work for women 50 years and older in our sample from the 
manufacturing industry by age, 1994-2001
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics for the firms in the sample 
Year Process changes 
(1=process changes, 
0= no process 
changes 
Number of  
firms 
Mean of median  
investment rates. 
In percent 
1997 0 1029 29.3 
1999 0 1296 30.0 
2001 0 966 30.9 
1997 1 597 30.1 
1999 1 352 32.4 
2001 1 477 32.0 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
    Women    
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Median investment rate 0,31 0,26 0 11,86
Process changes 0,45 0,50 0 1
Age 56,29 3,96 51 65
Health  0,60 0,49 0 1
Education,  -10 years 0,39 0,49 0 1
Education, 10 - 14 years 0,55 0,50 0 1
Education, 14 years and more 0,06 0,23 0 1
Married  0,69 0,46 0 1
Net Wealth 1,89 10,32 -44,38 1362,83
Employment change  0,62 0,49 0 1
Share retired 0,23 0,03 0,18 0,28
Local unemployment rate 0,03 0,01 0 0,18
Part time work  0,26 0,44 0 1
AFP 0,03 0,18 0 1
Obervations 28138     
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Men    
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Median investment rate 0,28 0,20 0 5,21
Investment spike 0,47 0,50 0 1
Age 56,79 4,21 51 66
Health  0,49 0,50 0 1
Education,  -10 years 0,32 0,46 0 1
Education, 10 - 14 years 0,54 0,50 0 1
Education, 14 years and more 0,15 0,35 0 1
Married  0,78 0,42 0 1
Net Wealth 3,48 30,21 -69,21 5846,67
Employment change  0,62 0,49 0 1
Share retired 0,17 0,02 0,13 0,22
Local unemployment rate 0,03 0,01 0 0,18
Part time work  0,03 0,17 0 1
AFP 0,05 0,21 0 1
Obervations 91718     
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Table 3 
Probit estimation of the probability of retiring conditional on being in work 
Variables/Gender 
 
Men 
 
Women 
Constant -2.487* 
(0.5644) 
-0.9704 
(0.8807) 
Median investment rate 51 years old 0.0012 
(0.0025) 
0.0031 
(0.0035) 
Median investment rate 52 years old -0.0011 
(0.0027) 
-0.0055 
(0.0032) 
Median investment rate 53 years old -0.0017 
(0.0025) 
-0.0044 
(0.0031) 
Median investment rate 54 years old -0.0025 
(0.0026) 
-0.0037 
(0.0027) 
Median investment rate 55 years old 0.0023 
(0.0021) 
0.0021 
(0.0029) 
Median investment rate 56 years old 0.0017 
(0.0024) 
-0.0032 
(0.0038) 
Median investment rate 57 years old 0.0015 
(0.0022) 
-0.0064 
(0.0036) 
Median investment rate 58 years old -0.0047 
(0.0026) 
-0.0026 
(0.0022) 
Median investment rate 59 years old -0.0041 
(0.0024) 
0.0054* 
(0.0027) 
Median investment rate 60 years old 0.0009 
(0.0021) 
-0.0023 
(0.0033) 
Median investment rate 61 years old 0.0008 
(0.0023) 
0.0021 
(0.0039) 
Median investment rate 62 years old -0.0044* 
(0.002) 
0.0035 
(0.0026) 
Median investment rate 63 years old -0.0061* 
(0.0018) 
-0.002 
(0.0019) 
Median investment rate 64 years old -0.0091* 
(0.002) 
-0.0038 
(0.0037) 
Median investment rate 65 years old -0.0055* 
(0.0022) 
-0.0008 
(0.0043) 
Median investment rate 66 years old -0.0049* 
(0.0023) 
- 
Process change 51 years old 0.0008 
(0.0011) 
0.0003 
(0.0015) 
Process change 52 years old -0.0008 
(0.001) 
0.0015 
(0.0014) 
Process change 53 years old -0.0011 
(0.001) 
0.0006 
(0.0014) 
Process change 54 years old -0.0012 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.0014) 
Process change 55 years old 0.0000 
(0.0009) 
-0.0024 
(0.0014) 
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Process change 56 years old -0.0006 
(0.001) 
0.0005 
(0.0014) 
Process change 57 years old -0.0004 
(0.001) 
0.0003 
(0.0014) 
Process change 58 years old -0.0001 
(0.0009) 
-0.0019 
(0.0014) 
Process change 59 years old -0.0019* 
(0.0009) 
-0.002 
(0.0015) 
Process change 60 years old -0.002* 
(0.0009) 
-0.0003 
(0.0014) 
Process change 61 years old 0.0008 
(0.0008) 
-0.0012 
(0.0014) 
Process change 62 years old 0.0012 
(0.0007) 
0.0001 
(0.0013) 
Process change 63 years old 0.0011 
(0.0007) 
0.0009 
(0.0013) 
Process change 64 years old 0.0023* 
(0.0008) 
0.0003 
(0.0015) 
Process change 65 years old 0.0001 
(0.0009) 
0.0045* 
(0.0017) 
Process change 66 years old 0.002* 
(0.001) 
- 
Age 52 0.2399* 
(0.0739) 
0.2306* 
(0.0982) 
Age 53 0.2442* 
(0.0734) 
0.2165* 
(0.0991) 
Age 54 0.2236* 
(0.0749) 
0.236* 
(0.0971) 
Age 55 0.2345* 
(0.0716) 
0.2399* 
(0.0996) 
Age 56 0.2754* 
(0.0739) 
0.2852* 
(0.1077) 
Age 57 0.2963* 
(0.0735) 
0.3208* 
(0.1079) 
Age 58 0.5052* 
(0.0754) 
0.4462* 
(0.0985) 
Age 59 0.5599* 
(0.0747) 
0.3055* 
(0.1035) 
Age 60 0.5957* 
(0.0729) 
0.4996* 
(0.1085) 
Age 61 0.6262* 
(0.0746) 
0.5291* 
(0.1137) 
Age 62 1.028* 
(0.0759) 
0.7078* 
(0.116) 
Age 63 1.6361* 
(0.0907) 
1.2061* 
(0.1266) 
Age 64 1.7259* 
(0.0953) 
1.2933* 
(0.1459) 
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Age 65 2.0459* 
(0.1013) 
1.1639* 
(0.1627) 
Age 66 1.8897* 
(0.111) 
- 
AFP 62 years 0.8366* 
(0.0473) 
0.8437* 
(0.0834) 
AFP 63 years 0.5548* 
(0.068) 
0.4813* 
(0.1009) 
AFP 64 years 0.7282* 
(0.0737) 
0.7454* 
(0.115) 
AFP 65 years 0.6406* 
(0.0784) 
0.821* 
(0.1283) 
AFP 66 years 0.6065* 
(0.0918) 
- 
Education, 10 - 14 years -0.1462* 
(0.0141) 
-0.1936* 
(0.0219) 
Education, 15 years and more -0.3893* 
(0.0239) 
-0.2908* 
(0.0552) 
Married -0.1337* 
(0.015) 
-0.0597* 
(0.0222) 
Net wealth -0.0003 
(0.0005) 
0.0007 
(0.0011) 
Share of retired in county 1.6243* 
(0.3349) 
0.6389 
(0.4711) 
Local unemployment rate 3.9988* 
(0.6328) 
4.725* 
(0.9992) 
Part-time work 1.4749* 
(0.0288) 
0.7674* 
(0.0226) 
Bad health 0.6446* 
(0.0141) 
0.6177* 
(0.0232) 
Employment reduction 0.1473* 
(0.017) 
0.1263* 
(0.0266) 
Year 1999 0.7378 
(0.5953) 
-0.8702 
(1.0038) 
Year 2001 0.0135 
(0.7801) 
-1.7866 
(1.1384) 
Dummy variables for industry *Year Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -24144 -9887 
Number of observations 91718 28138 
* Significant at the 95 % - level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The representative individual is 52 year old, has education up to 10 years, is not married, working full-time, with 
good health and the year is 1997. 
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Table 4 
Estimated effects of technological changes. In percentage points 
Age Process changes1 Median investment rates2 
 Men Women Men Women 
60 -1.4* -0.7 0.0 -0.6 
61 0.7 -2.8 0.1 0.5 
62 2.8 0.2 -1.0* 0.5 
63 2.7 1.3 -1.5* 0.3 
64 5.6* 0.3 -2.2* -0.4 
65 0.2 4.2* -1.3* -0.1 
66 4.9* - -1.2* - 
1 The effect of process changes estimated from the probit model. 
2 The effect of an increase in the median investment rate of 10 percentage points estimated from the probit model. 
* Significant at 95 %. 
 
 
Table 5 
Estimated effects of technological changes. Transitions to disability pension.                       
In percentage points 
Age Process changes1 Median investment rates2 
 Men Women Men Women 
60 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.3 
61 2.3 -0.9 -0.1 0.7 
62 1.9 4.6 -0.7 0.0 
63 4.4 -0.4 -1.3* -1.2 
64 7.2* -0.8 -3.4* -0.8 
65 0.4 -0.9 -1.5* -1.9 
66 5.4 - -0.8 - 
1 The effect of process changes estimated from the probit model. 
2 The effect of an increase in the median investment rate of 10 percentage points estimated from the probit model. 
* Significant at 95 %. 
 
 
Table 6 
Estimated effects of technological changes. Transitions to AFP pension.                               
In percentage points 
Age Process changes1 Median investment rates2 
 Men Women Men Women 
62 0.7 1.0  0.0  2.6*  
63 0.6  7.1  -0.3  -1.3  
64 1.6  -0.9  -0.9* 1.8  
65 0.9 19.0*  -0.9  1.1  
66  3.5* -  -0.9* - 
1 The effect of process changes estimated from the probit model. 
2 The effect of an increase in the median investment rate of 10 percentage points estimated from the probit model. 
* Significant at 95 %. 
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Appendix A. Probit regression results 
 
Transition to disability pension 
Variables/Gender 
 
Men 
 
Women 
Constant -4.0093* 
(0.9796) 
-1.1468 
(0.8851) 
Median investment rate 51 years old -0.0005 
(0.004) 
-0.0017 
(0.0047)  
Median investment rate 52 years old  -0.0015 
(0.0038) 
-0.0052 
(0.0036)  
Median investment rate 53 years old  -0.0072 
(0.0039) 
-0.0031 
(0.0033)  
Median investment rate 54 years old  -0.0028 
(0.0038) 
-0.0048 
(0.0044)  
Median investment rate 55 years old  -0.0071* 
(0.0036) 
0.0026 
(0.0036) 
Median investment rate 56 years old  -0.0011 
(0.0036) 
-0.0026 
(0.0045)  
Median investment rate 57 years old 0.0005 
(0.0027) 
-0.0114* 
(0.0048)  
Median investment rate 58 years old  -0.0081* 
(0.0035) 
-0.006 
(0.0047)  
Median investment rate 59 years old -0.0059 
(0.0031) 
0.0029 
(0.0035) 
Median investment rate 60 years old  0.0019 
(0.0026) 
0.0018 
(0.0035)  
Median investment rate 61 years old -0.0006 
(0.0031)  
0.0043 
(0.0047)  
Median investment rate 62 years old -0.0041 
(0.0037) 
0.0004 
(0.0039)  
Median investment rate 63 years old -0.0069* 
(0.0035)  
-0.008 
(0.0065) 
Median investment rate 64 years old -0.0129* 
(0.004)  
-0.0063 
(0.0053)  
Median investment rate 65 years old  -0.0077* 
(0.0037) 
-0.0105 
(0.0074) 
Median investment rate 66 years old -0.0041 
(0.0041) 
- 
Process change 51 years old  0.0004 
(0.0016) 
0.0000 
(0.0018)  
Process change 52 years old  0.0003 
(0.0014) 
0.0017 
(0.0017)  
Process change 53 years old  0.0000 
(0.0014) 
-0.0001 
(0.0018)  
Process change 54 years old 
 
 
 -0.0006 
(0.0015) 
-0.0018 
(0.0018)  
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Process change 55 years old  0.0005 
(0.0013) 
-0.0021 
(0.0018)  
Process change 56 years old -0.0002 
(0.0013)  
-0.0002 
(0.0017)  
Process change 57 years old 0.0013 
(0.0012) 
-0.0008 
(0.0018)  
Process change 58 years old  0.0017 
(0.0012) 
-0.0023 
(0.0017)  
Process change 59 years old -0.0012 
(0.0012) 
-0.0011 
(0.0018)  
Process change 60 years old  -0.0002 
(0.0011) 
0.0005 
(0.0018)  
Process change 61 years old 0.0019 
(0.0011) 
-0.0006 
(0.0018)  
Process change 62 years old  0.001 
(0.0012) 
0.0035 
(0.0021)  
Process change 63 years old 0.0024 
(0.0013)  
-0.0003 
(0.0022)  
Process change 64 years old 0.0035* 
(0.0014) 
-0.0007 
(0.0024)  
Process change 65 years old  0.0002 
(0.0015) 
-0.0005 
(0.0028)  
Process change 66 years old 0.0031 
(0.0018)  
- 
Age 52 0.2375* 
(0.1069) 
0.1238 
(0.1217)  
Age 53 0.2805* 
(0.1081)  
0.0291 
(0.1224)  
Age 54 0.1667 
(0.1099) 
0.1013 
(0.1302)  
Age 55 0.3815* 
(0.1065) 
0.0336 
(0.1275) 
Age 56  0.3986* 
(0.1075) 
0.2317 
(0.1326)  
Age 57  0.3754* 
(0.1030) 
0.3173* 
(0.1354)  
Age 58  0.6531* 
(0.1057) 
0.4624* 
(0.1358)  
Age 59  0.7589* 
(0.1035) 
0.3367* 
(0.1293)  
Age 60  0.8475* 
(0.1018) 
0.5082* 
(0.1319)  
Age 61  0.9357* 
(0.1074) 
0.6393* 
(0.1411)  
Age 62  1.4597* 
(0.1140) 
0.7058* 
(0.1567)  
Age 63  1.8970* 
(0.1282) 
1.2262* 
(0.1902)  
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Age 64  1.9317* 
(0.1351) 
1.3088* 
(0.1864)  
Age 65  2.2404* 
(0.1370) 
1.2040* 
(0.2306)  
Age 66  1.9946* 
(0.1527) 
- 
AFP 62 years  -0.1671* 
(0.0736) 
0.0533 
(0.1271) 
AFP 63 years  -0.4829* 
(0.0893) 
-0.2564 
(0.1408)  
AFP 64 years  -0.3084* 
(0.0984) 
-0.2178 
(0.1542)  
AFP 65 years  -0.6728* 
(0.1015) 
-0.3284 
(0.1783) 
AFP 66 years  -0.7749* 
(0.1214) 
- 
Education, 10 - 14 years  -0.1979* 
(0.0198) 
-0.2461* 
(0.0281)  
Education, 15 years and more  -0.6005* 
(0.0423) 
-0.4965* 
(0.0840)  
Married  -0.1107* 
(0.0213) 
-0.1630* 
(0.0288)  
Net wealth  -0.0012 
(0.0010) 
-0.0021 
(0.0026) 
Share of retired in county  3.2304* 
(0.4836) 
1.7160* 
(0.6108)  
Local unemployment rate  3.0479* 
(0.8942) 
4-0256* 
(1.2379) 
Part-time work  1.9747* 
(0.0355) 
1.0036* 
(0.0290)  
Bad health 1.2030* 
(0.0270) 
0.8671* 
(0.0334)  
Employment reduction  0.0661* 
(0.0239) 
0.1041* 
(0.0339)  
Year 1999  1.1931 
(1.0082) 
-1.0270 
(1.1161)  
Year 2001  0.5755 
(1.1670) 
-0.0866 
(1.1644)  
Dummy variables for industry *Year Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -11,246 -5,271 
Number of observations  74,349 22,442 
* Significant at the 95 % - level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The representative individual is 52 years old, has up to 10 years of education, is not married, 
works full time, and has good health. The representative year is 1997. 
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Transition to AFP pension 
Variables/Gender 
 
Men 
 
Women 
Constant -2.4767* 
(0.6387) 
-1.3203* 
(0.5273)  
Median investment rate 62 years old  -0.0009 
(0.0026) 
0.0135* 
(0.0052) 
Median investment rate 63 years old  -0.0034 
(0.0022) 
-0.0006 
(0.0063)  
Median investment rate 64 years old  -0.0072* 
(0.0024) 
-0.0074 
(0.0053)  
Median investment rate 65 years old  -0.0052 
(0.0028) 
0.0043 
(0.0069)  
Median investment rate 66 years old  -0.006* 
(0.0028) 
- 
Process change 62 years old  0.0021 
(0.0011) 
0.0006 
(0.0024)  
Process change 63 years old  0.0008 
(0.0009) 
0.0035 
(0.0021)  
Process change 64 years old  0.0015 
(0.0010) 
-0.0004 
(0.0023)  
Process change 65 years old  0.0006 
(0.0011) 
0.0075* 
(0.0025)  
Process change 66 years old  0.0025* 
(0.0012 
- 
Age 63 0.5620* 
(0.0792) 
0.4688* 
(0.1948)  
Age 64  0.9093* 
(0.0838) 
1.0631* 
(0.1964)  
Age 65  1.1192* 
(0.0917) 
0.8577* 
(0.2142)  
Age 66 0.9606* 
(0.0985) 
- 
Education, 10 - 14 years  -0.1459* 
(0.0306) 
-0.2030* 
(0.0724)  
Education, 14 years and more  -0.5893* 
(0.0437) 
-0.4126* 
(0.1653)  
Married  0.0158 
(0.0343) 
0.4355* 
(0.0705)  
Net wealth  -0.0028* 
(0.0014) 
0.0061 
(0.0080) 
Share of retired in county 1.4192* 
(0.7108)  
0.2274 
(1.5528)  
Local unemployment rate  5.7117* 
(1.4140) 
7.2906 
(3.7461)  
Part-time work 
 
 
 0.7307* 
(0.0663) 
0.2048* 
(0.0754)  
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Bad health  0.0694* 
(0.0274) 
0.0971 
(0.0669)  
Employment reduction 0.2601* 
(0.0374) 
0.3677* 
(0.0930)  
Year 1999  0.8149 
(0.8753) 
-0.7434 
(1.0905)  
Year 2001 1.2634 
(1.0846) 
-0.1161 
(1.1111)  
Dummy variables for industry *Year Yes Yes 
Log likelihood  -6,214 -1,154  
Number of observations  10,796 2,012  
* Significant at the 95 % - level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The representative individual is 52 years old, has up to 10 years of education, is not married, 
works full time, and has good health. The representative year is 1997. 
 
 
  
Appendix B. Survival in the initial state and transition to other states 
 
  There are several exit routes out of work. From some of the states, there may be transitions back 
into work. If an individual is unemployed, on rehabilitation, or out of work for other reasons, there is a 
possibility of transition back into work. Conditional on being unemployed, will the person continue to 
be unemployed in the following year and subsequent years, or will there be transition to other states, 
such as employment or a disability pension? The answer to this question can be used to determine 
whether the out-of-work state is temporary or a final destination out of the labor market. 
 In Figure B.1, the survival rates for unemployment and the rates of transition to employment 
and disability for men are shown. It is shown that 35 percent of men aged 51 that were unemployed at 
the age of 50 remain unemployed. About 30 percent are in work and the rest are mainly on disability 
pensions or in the group 'other'. The proportion of unemployed falls to 35 percent the first year, and then 
to about 20 percent after four years. It then remains under 20 percent for those aged up to 60. Thereafter, 
the proportion of unemployed people increases, and for those aged 66, 55 percent of those who were 
initially unemployed in our sample remain so. 
 The corresponding figures for women are shown in Figure B.2. For women, the picture is 
similar. There are only minor differences regarding the absolute shares. 
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Figure B1:
Survival in unemployment and transition to employment and disability for 
men by age
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Figure B.2. Survival of unemployment and transition to employment and disability for women by age 
Figure B2:
Survival in unemployment and transition to employment and disability for 
wpmen by age
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  Patterns for individuals starting in rehabilitation are illustrated in Figure B.3 for men and in 
Figure B.4 for women. There is initially a large decrease in the share still in rehabilitation the first two 
years. Thereafter, the share continues to decrease, but by less. Most of the individuals in rehabilitation 
subsequently receive a disability pension. For 66-year-olds starting in rehabilitation, 80 percent have a 
disability pension. Few return to work. As in the case with unemployment, there are no significant 
differences between men and women, as can be seen from the two figures. 
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Figure B.3:
Survival in rehabilitation and transition to employment and disability for 
men by age
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Figure B.4:
Survival in rehabilitation and transition to employment and disability for 
women by age
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  Few people are on temporary disability pensions, and they either continue to receive these 
pensions or subsequently get permanent disability pensions. Between 60 and 70 percent of individuals 
who start on a temporary disability pension end up receiving a permanent disability pension, whereas 20 
to 35 percent continue on a temporary disability pension. This picture is the same for men and women. 
Figures B.5 and B.6 show the shares surviving in the group 'other' and the transitions to employment 
and disability pension for men and women, respectively. There is some transition to work, and about 40 
percent of 55-year-old men are in work. Thereafter, the share in work falls as the share in the group 
'other' starts to rise again. Figure B.6 shows developments for women. It differs somewhat from what 
we saw for men when it comes to the transition from the group 'other' into work. Fewer women leave 
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the 'other' state for work. No more than 25 percent are in work at the ages of 53 and 54. For ages beyond 
54, the share in work decreases. Thus, fewer women starting in the group 'other' leave this state. More 
women than men stay at home, which may in part explain these differences. 
 
  
Figure B.5:
Survival in the group "other" and transition to employment and 
disability for men by age
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Figure B.6:
Survival in the group "other" and transition to employment and disability 
for women by age
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C. Sample  
 
  We constructed three cross-sectional samples, one for each innovation and R&D 
survey. For each of these surveys, we sampled individuals employed in these firms at the end of 
the year before the survey began and for all the years including the year of the survey. The 
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survey covers the year of the survey and the two preceding years. The cross-section sample 
includes individuals employed in the firms covered by the survey during the three years prior to 
the survey year as well as those employed in the survey year. We then classified the individuals 
according to whether they remained employed or retired at the end of the survey year. The 
numbers of observations by year and in total are shown in Table C.1. 
 
 
Table C.1.  
Observations by year 
Year Observations 
1997 44,743 
1999 47,220 
2001 48,957 
Total 140,920 
 
 
D. Retirement rates for three age groups 1992-2001 
 
  In Figures D.1 and D.2, we show the developments in the shares of people on a 
disability pension and those on an AFP pension for the three age groups for the period 1992–
2001. The share on a disability pension differs between age groups, and the oldest age groups 
have a higher share on a disability pension. The development for each age group is quite stable 
over the period. For men, there seems to be a small reduction towards the end of the 
observation period for the two oldest age groups, while in the age group 50–55, the share on a 
disability pension is about the same as in 1992 and 2001. For women, the share on a disability 
pension increases from 1992 to 2001, and increases for the oldest age cohorts. For the other 
cohorts, the share on a disability pension in 2001 is about the same as that in 1992, but the 
shares decrease somewhat after 1992 and then increase again up to 2001. 
 The share of people with an AFP pension increases in all the years for both women and 
men. The shares increase particularly in years in which the age limit was reduced, namely in 
1997, when the age for entitlement to an AFP pension was reduced from 64 to 63 years, and in 
1998, when the reduction was from 63 to 62 years. 
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Figure D.1:
Share with disability pension and AFP pension for men aged 50-66,
 1992-2001 
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Figure D.2:
Share with disability pension and AFP pension for women aged 50-66, 
1992-2001
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